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Kirsten Hyldgaard
What Is Called Thinking? 
– According to Heidegger and 
Psychoanalysis
What has always struck me, ever since I first read Being and Time as 
a young student, is the congeniality between Heidegger and Lacan. 
First, I noted the seemingly analogous approaches of Heidegger’s 
existentialia in Being and Time, these formal conditions of possibility 
for Dasein’s being-in-the-world, and Lacan’s formalistic, structural-
ist version of clinical categories1. Later, of course, I learned that La-
can had translated one of Heidegger’s texts (“Logos”), and had even 
courted Heidegger – albeit with little success.2
In Heidegger’s lectures on What is called thinking?, the congenial-
ity between Heidegger and psychoanalysis, and in particular what it 
means to analyze in psychoanalysis, is even more striking. This arti-
cle will focus on the congeniality rather than the differences between 
Heidegger and Lacan. Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis can suggest a 
particular interpretation of Heidegger’s thinking – and vice versa. I 
am especially thinking of the psychoanalytical concept of resistance 
to analysis, and the somewhat similar idea in Heidegger’s concept of 
truth, a-letheia – i.e., truth, not as a question of correspondence and 
correctness, but as the un-concealed – and the concept of withdrawal 
as an event: “Entzug” as “Ereignis”.
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The title, What is Called Thinking?, might lead the reader to ex-
pect an answer, an exposition of what thinking is all about. Rather 
than providing answers, what we get, however, is just more questions; 
thinking is a question of what it means to question. 
Thinkers or philosophers are also characterized by the concepts 
that they can do without. In Heidegger, the concepts of subject, con-
sciousness, intentionality, ideas or representations are left behind. 
To think is without a subject in the sense of foundation: there is no 
subject of consciousness, of intentionality, of ideas or representations. 
These concepts are, if anything, an obstacle to thinking. In place of the 
subject, we get the existentiale “Dasein”, this singular being without 
essence, identity or substance, this being which is “open” rather than 
representing.
Thought without a subject, thought without consciousness. How 
can this be congenial with Lacan’s thinking, considering that Laca-
nian psychoanalysis can be characterized as nothing but a theory of 
the subject? The answer, of course, lies in the Lacanian subject being 
“the subject of the unconscious”.
Thinking is not a meditative, reflective phenomenon; thinking 
is something that may occur, “ereignen”, and this event, “Ereignis”, 
concerns truth, and truth concerns “a-letheia” – the revealing of what 
is concealed – as opposed to truth conceived of as harmonious corre-
spondence and correctness, ”orthotes”, as in the root of orthodoxy 
and orthography. Truth is an event. But this event is not just some-
thing which you have to submit to, comparable to a revelation that 
overwhelms you. This un-concealment concerns both the event (“Er-
eignis”) and withdrawal (“Entzug”). I will say more about this with-
drawal below. Given this, how can we learn to think and how, and 
in what sense, if it makes sense at all, can what we do as university 
teachers be thought of as teaching others to think? 
WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE PROBLEM?
Why is it a problem that we do not think and what prevents us from 
thinking? First, a short summary of what thinking is not, according to 
Heidegger: Thinking is neither philosophy nor science. Nor is psycho-
analysis. That thinking is neither philosophy nor science is something 
Heidegger points out repeatedly throughout his oeuvre, from Being 
and Time to the final works. Philosophy is metaphysics. Thinking nei-
ther concerns “Anschauungen” – perception or sense awareness – nor 
“Vorstellungen” – ideas or representations. Thinking is not a matter 
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of whether our ideas or representations correspond with an external 
reality, whether they are correct and can stand the test of reality.
Now, why is philosophy not thinking according to Heidegger? 
The problem with philosophy, conceived as metaphysics, is that meta-
physics forgets the question of Being, and it does so by providing an-
swers. Metaphysics is the answer to a question that has been forgot-
ten; a question it no longer makes sense to ask. Metaphysics concerns 
forgetting; metaphysics concerns answers. Answers are the problem 
as far as thinking is concerned. Metaphysics has the answer to every-
thing, to Being as a whole. 
Forgetting and repressing are, arguably, not identical, but both 
concepts refer to something that we once knew. In metaphysics, the 
very meaning of the question (“der Sinn des Seins”) has been forgot-
ten. The question of what is Being, the meaning of Being, is answered 
with something present; some or other entity (“Seiende”) is a stand-
in. Metaphysics is a cover-up. 
In distinction to sciences that ask and answer questions about 
a defined being, metaphysics provides answers to the question of the 
world as a whole (“das Seiende im Ganzen”). The answer to the ques-
tion is conceived of as the universal: God, History, Atoms, Nature. 
Thinking, on the other hand, is to ask the question of Being. 
Thinking is not to provide answers to the question; it is to see that 
there is a question that needs asking, to see the meaning of the ques-
tion itself. Thinking is this interminable questioning; to question 
is the piety of thinking (“Das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Den-
kens”).3
The question of Being is forgotten by being conceived of as the 
most self-evident: it needs no one or nothing else to justify itself, it 
needs no reference to anything or anyone, it needs no Other. It is what 
Lacan designates “the discourse of the master”.4 Everything is …: 
numbers, God-given, natural, atoms, historically variable social con-
structions … A master discourse does not make sense, it puts to work. 
This work is an effort to make sense of the non-sensical first pre-sup-
position. A master signifier is the first, exceptional signifier that starts 
the chain of signifiers called knowledge. As such, a master discourse 
does not invite, it even precludes questions. You are not supposed to 
dispute a master signifier; you are supposed to submit to it. It goes 
without saying. Strictly speaking, disputing the master signifier does 
not make sense, it disrupts given sense: it unchains the chains of sig-
nifiers. 
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The question of Being points towards what we always already 
accept; what goes without saying; this pre-reflexive or pre-ontological 
understanding of Being, as Heidegger phrases it in Being and Time. 
Thereby, the meaning of Being remains concealed, and it is therefore 
necessary to raise the question. 
Thinking is about the self-evident – the pre-ontological under-
standing – losing its status as self-evident. In Lacanian terms, the mas-
ter signifier needs to be questioned. But who or what performs this 
questioning if there is neither a conscious nor an intentional subject 
to initiate it?
WHAT MAKES US THINK?
Thinking has to do with loss or withdrawal. When you think, you do 
not gain anything, be it knowledge, information, competences, skills 
or mastery. Provided it makes sense to speak about learning to think, 
we do not learn anything useful. Rather, we lose something when the 
self-evident, the first principle, the fundamental answer to everything 
is questioned. When you can question something, this very ‘thing’ is 
lost to you. This could be the beginning of an answer as to why think-
ing is no easy task, why there could be good reason to resist it. 
Members of psychoanalytic societies are of course familiar with 
the idea of loss, even of a fundamental loss as a precondition for the 
subject. The M’Other does not become Other before we lose her; the 
object becomes an object when we have lost it. Reminiscing is the 
key to seeing the object as an object. You need to lose something and 
remember this loss in order to begin to think. Thinking is not about 
possessing, ‘grasping’ something present. You do not ‘get it’ when 
thinking; you ‘lose it’.
Now, the trick is that it is not up to you and me; it is not the sub-
ject who triggers this loss or withdrawal: it is the Other, the big Oth-
er. In What is called thinking?, Heidegger makes a significant remark 
about being religious and losing faith: “But nothing religious is ever 
destroyed by logic; it is destroyed only by the God’s withdrawal”.5 
[“Das Religiöse wird niemals durch die Logik zerstört, sondern immer 
nur dadurch, dass der Gott sich entzieht”.6]
It would probably be more accurate not to translate “God” with 
a capital “G”. “God” does not refer to the one and only, the mono-
theistic God, it refers to any god. In German, this is what “der Gott” 
refers to, in distinction to just “Gott” – analogous to the expression, 
“Gott sei dank”, and in distinction to Heidegger’s famous statement 
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in the posthumously published interview in Der Spiegel (September 23, 
1966): “Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten”, “Only a god can save 
us”.
This translation issue aside, what is important here is that it is 
the Other, the god or a god that withdraws. Logic does not make us 
lose faith; the power of the good argument in itself has seldom, if ever, 
convinced anyone – as Freud also remarks in his lecture on transfer-
ence (Freud 1968). In Freud, the question of transference is a question 
of being able to love. Love is a condition of possibility for learning. 
You need faith in, even love for the Other in order to be able to learn. 
However, here, in Heidegger, the condition of possibility for thinking 
is loss: to lose faith in the Other. The equivalent, as far as the ques-
tion of transference is concerned, could be the lifting of transference; 
i.e., when the Other loses his or her status as “the subject supposed 
to know”. In other words: when the matrix of how the unconscious 
subject relates to the Other loses its self-evidence, its necessity, and 
is seen as just one matrix among others: as the unconscious subject’s 
singular matrix.
BEING AS LOGOS
Thinking in psychoanalysis is not logic in the sense of being con-
cerned with consistency and non-contradiction, or in the form of valid 
inference, reason and rationality. The psychoanalytic concept of the 
unconscious does not respect the law of non-contradiction and time. 
According to Heidegger, “logos”, etymologically, means “speech” 
(“Rede”), “what is spoken”, discourse. This is not restricted to propo-
sitional sentences, judgements to which we can ascribe truth or falsity. 
“Speaking is being with the world, it is something originary and situ-
ated before judgement.”7 Speaking constitutes the existence of man.8 
In Heidegger’s article on Heraclitus’ so-called Fragments, en-
titled “Logos”, which Lacan translated into French, the question of 
Being is interpreted as “logos”. Furthermore, logos is referred to its 
root in “legein”, talking and saying.9 The question of speech refers 
Heidegger to the question of hearing and what it means to listen 
[“Hören”] to this logos. 10 “Logos is in itself and at the same time a 
revealing and a concealing. It is a-letheia”.11 In speech it all comes 
together: Being, truth, and logos. One can see why this article has 
been of particular interest to Lacan: psychoanalysis does not analyze 
the psyche but speech; an analyst is someone who can listen, and man 
is according to Lacan a “parlêtre”. 
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Those, who can listen, hear the effects of the unconscious in the 
spoken word, and these seemingly accidental and senseless, illogical 
speech acts do have a ‘logic’ in the sense of a form. Freud speaks about 
“Gedanken”, thoughts, as far as the unconscious is concerned. These 
are thoughts in the sense of not being without sense; there is some-
thing to be interpreted. The psychoanalyst’s interpretations are often 
called interventions because they are neither propositions – true or 
false – nor convincing explanations of what the problem and situa-
tion is all about: an interpretation of the meaning of the symptom in 
order to provide a diagnosis. Interventions do not make the situation 
understandable or restore meaning; rather, they are supposed to high-
light the ‘logic’ of the unconscious in order to create the possibility of 
changing the situation and meaning.
Self-appointed representatives of reason, rationality and con-
sistent, non-contradictory logic can rage against believers and others 
lost in sad irrationalism by using logic and so-called rational argu-
mentation. The pressing question is, however, why the power of the 
good argument is powerless, why rationality is often ineffectual, why 
the believer can – in good faith, so to speak – shake off rationality as 
the proverbial duck does to water. Of course, this is the raison d’être 
of psychoanalysis. To repeat, the unconscious is a way of thinking that 
ignores rules of non-contradiction and time, and psychoanalysis is an 
analysis of this other ‘logic’.
You can lose faith, though. Your god may no longer be with you. 
Your god can withdraw from you. You can lose any faith, any belief, 
any conviction. Disillusionment can be likened to a mourning process, 
even be a melancholic affair. The self-evidence of the Other is lost. The 
Other is lost as Other. You have lost a cherished belief. If the belief in 
a god is translated into any kind of self-evidence, it is the self-evident 
itself that withdraws; it is no longer there not to demand a question.
 
THE NON-SENSICAL ‘NO’
An example: When teaching, I have often found occasion to speak 
about Lévi-Strauss’ approach to kinship relations and, in particular, 
the incest taboo. According to Lévi-Strauss, this taboo is the funda-
mental taboo; it is an axiom of culture, a fundamental law, a precon-
dition for culture, an irreversible break between culture and nature12.
I have always strived to present the arguments, based on anthro-
pologists’ analysis of various empirical kinship relations, as to why 
the incest taboo cannot be explained by natural, functional causes: 
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that it cannot be explained by some kind of biological, instinct-driven 
repulsion against sexual relations with next of kin in order to prevent 
inbreeding. 
Biology can neither explain why incest is, in fact, committed 
rather frequently nor why it is punished when committed. Why would 
you need to prohibit and punish something that nobody was inclined 
to do?
In Lévi-Strauss, culture is defined as “the exchange of women 
among men”. Marriage is fundamentally not a relation between a 
man and a woman, but a transaction that forges alliances between 
two men or two social groups of men. The law against incest prevents 
a father or brother from keeping his daughter or sister to himself and 
forces him to hand her over to his future son-in-law or brother-in-law. 
Daughters and sisters are the fundamental ‘good’ whose purpose is to 
be exchanged among men that are not blood-related and thereby cre-
ate obligations among these men. This is no less than the very defini-
tion of culture. In order to exchange a good, in order for a good to be 
such, you need to give it up, you cannot keep it to yourself and enjoy 
it all by yourself. Women are the fundamental good.
When lecturing on this topic I am made acutely aware of my 
powerlessness as a teacher. I, invariably, meet resistance. When I 
question the self-evidence of the incest taboo, the students protest by 
saying that, yes, nature must offer an explanation: genetics and their 
function, their purpose, is in fact some kind of natural, biological in-
stinct to prevent inbreeding. Biology and nature are the prime mov-
ers. I then proceed to repeat anthropologists’ arguments as to why a 
biological explanation is insufficient: if it is an instinct that prevents 
us from inbreeding, why does it in fact happen rather often in human 
communities, and why do other mammals not abide by this law. And 
why, in some cultures, are cousins on the maternal side taboo but not 
cousins on the paternal side, or vice versa? Why is the incest taboo not 
restricted to the biological family? Why can it prevent an individual 
from one clan from marrying an individual who is not blood-related 
but belongs to another, prohibited clan. And why does the taboo in-
clude adopted children, brothers and sisters?
The incest taboo is simply a fundamental and universal ‘no’, I 
argue. Strictly speaking, it does not make sense; it is a non-sensical 
condition of possibility for culture. It has no other ‘function’ than 
to state that not everything is possible. Not everybody – literally – is 
accessible and enjoyable. A human being, in order to become a man, 
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simply has to submit to this law. What is important is not what we 
are prevented from enjoying, but the very prohibition itself. This is 
what the concept of castration refers to in psychoanalysis. Castration 
– this brutal concept with painful connotations – means preventing 
the subject from enjoying simply by saying No: a no that has no sense 
in itself. The foundation of culture is a fundamental non-sensical ‘No’. 
My point, however, is not that Lévi-Strauss was right about the 
universality of the incest taboo in the correspondence and correctness 
sense of truth. After all, this question is debated among anthropolo-
gists even today; it is far from a settled matter. My point is that the 
very questioning of the naturalness, and hence the self-evidence, of 
the incest taboo meets heavy resistance. I claim here that reference to 
biological, functional causes for the taboo on incest does not provide 
an explanation. Rather, it represents a resistance to the loss of self-ev-
idence; it represents a resistance to the loss of a god. Biology, the nat-
ural, is a cover-up, a metaphysical cover-up.
I cannot convince the students by presenting arguments against 
the explanatory force of biology, at least not exclusively. They need 
to lose faith in genetics, biology, the natural order, in order to be able 
to think through this question as a question. And what do you do as 
a teacher when you meet resistance; how do you teach students to 
question what seems to them to be self-evident? This is the question 
of how to learn to think and how to teach others to learn to think.
There are at least two points to be made here. First, the power-
lessness of logic, rationality and arguments that refer to “falsification” 
of beliefs. I can present all the empirical evidence that falsifies the 
explanatory force of biology. However, it is not ‘my’ arguments that 
make anyone lose faith. My arguments against the incest taboo being 
natural are impotent as far as some students are concerned, but not as 
far as all students are concerned. 
More importantly, as we have learned from psychoanalysis, there 
needs to be resistance in order to claim that what we analyze has any-
thing to do with analysis of the effects of the unconscious. No resis-
tance, no repression, means nothing to analyze. And some students see 
the point – that natural causes are no longer self-evident – precisely by 
contesting my arguments, protesting, ‘trying out’ their preconceived 
notions on me. They see that it can be discussed, it can be questioned.
Why not simply stop bringing up the incest taboo? Why this 
obsessive contestation of natural causes being self-evident? After all, 
I do not take any pleasure in being contested; at least that is what I 
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think; I am probably as narcissistic as the next professor. What kind 
of enjoyment (as distinguished from pleasure) is at play here? An an-
swer as to what might justify my, no doubt, obsessive question about 
the incest taboo defying natural causes is also that it hits a nerve with 
students; to repeat my point, it provokes resistance. The students do 
not just shrug their shoulders; they do not just yawn and consider my 
questions irrelevant: they stop taking notes. They protest. 
The students’ loss of self-evidence is not caused, at least not 
exclusively, by my arguments. And, to repeat, the universality of 
the incest taboo is by no means a question that has been settled in 
anthropological circles. Rather, it is the big Other that withdraws 
when some students lose faith. In other words, one implication of 
Heidegger’s concept of withdrawal is that if you, as a teacher, do not 
meet resistance, you do not teach students to think. Thinking is not 
just an add-on, like when you accumulate more knowledge about a 
particular subject. Thinking is not about knowledge. Thinking con-
cerns losing what you thought you knew. 
If one’s ambition is to teach others to think, it might be a good 
idea to remind oneself of Freud’s reflections on his own powerlessness 
when his analysands responded to his interventions with denial and 
even walked out on him. 
In order to think, you need to be unshackled – like the poor fel-
lows in Plato’s cave who needed someone to unshackle them and drag 
them out into the, at first, blinding sunlight, where they were thrown 
into a state of indecision, if not confusion, unable to ‘see’ anything.
TO LET LEARN
Heidegger’s contempt for conferences is well known. However, he did 
not hold teaching in contempt. As the introduction to the English 
translation of Was heisst Denken? correctly points out, most of Heideg-
ger’s publications after Being and Time were first written and came into 
being as lectures, often addressed to students (that is, not conference 
papers addressing academic peers), then as written publications. Lec-
turing and teaching students seemed to provoke Heidegger to think. 
This is worth pointing out because the idea that teaching is something 
that contributes to research is alien to contemporary discussions about 
the purpose of university education. Goals for learning objectives are 
stipulated, and goals imply that the teacher already knows what the 
students are supposed to learn. Teaching is supposed to be research–
based, but what ‘research’ and ‘based’ mean is rarely discussed. When 
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we ask this question, we also ask the question: Is thinking something 
we can learn and is it something we can teach others to do? Provided 
it makes sense at all to say that any of us think – and it does have a 
fundamentally presumptuous ring to it – is this something that we 
can teach others? Is thinking something you can be ‘capable of ’ and 
decide to do or is thinking something that happens to you – both as 
teacher and as student? According to Heidegger, teaching (“Lehren”) 
is “to let learn”.
Teaching is even more difficult than learning. […] Not because 
the teacher must have a larger store of information and have it al-
ways ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because what 
teaching calls for is this: to let learn. […] The teacher is far less 
assured of his ground than those who learn are of theirs. If the 
relation between the teacher and the taught is genuine, therefore, 
there is never a place in it for the authority of the-know-it-all or 
the authoritative sway of the official.13 
This presupposes Heidegger’s discussion of thinking in connection 
with his concept of truth – a-letheia. 
TRUTH
Heidegger’s exposition on the concept of truth is no doubt one of 
his most original contributions to philosophy. In Being and Time, the 
idea of truth as propositional truth, as a question of correspondence 
between statement and matter, rests on a pre-predicative concept of 
truth that founds all predicative truth. This pre-predicative truth has 
to do with the mode of man’s being, or Dasein. Man’s being is to be 
‘there’—the “Da” of Dasein—in the world, open to the world (Erschlos-
senheit). And the way the world is open to Dasein is truth. Truth is 
here no longer a question of cognition, but of how man’s way of being 
is (in contradistinction to first being a subject and then having) an 
understanding and interpretation, an openness, an unconcealedness. 
Truth means the same as matter (Sache) and that which reveals itself 
(Sichselbstzeigendes). Truth is thus used terminologically to determine 
the difference between beings and Being. Truth stands in an original 
connection to Being.14 Contrary to the modern idea that the place of 
truth rests in the proposition, Heideggerian truth stands in an original 
relation to Being. Heidegger hereby unties the knot between truth 
and knowledge.15
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Heidegger sticks to this “revelatory” definition of truth through-
out his work, but after the famous Kehre – that is, after Being and Time 
and his turning away from phenomenology – a shift toward a conflict-
ual conception of truth can be detected. Now truth is no longer just a 
question of Dasein’s “openness” and “being-in-the-world”; now “the 
essence of truth” becomes a conflict between revealing and concealing. 
This point is made in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, and it is here that 
the influence on psychoanalysis is obvious, for the symptom is defined 
as an effect of the unconscious – the symptom qua symptom is a failed 
repression, a compromise that both reveals and conceals the truth of 
the subject. The idea of truth as correspondence implies harmony, cor-
rectness or identity between two entities. Truth conceived as “event,” 
by contrast, implies disruption, conflict, or at least dynamics.
Instead of truth being a question of correspondence, perhaps 
even harmony, between an idea and an external reality, the dynam-
ic perspective highlights truth as what happens when something is 
un-covered, un-concealed. Heidegger interprets it in connection 
with his concept of “Ereignis”, which is usually translated as “event”. 
The unveiling of what is covered up is an event. It is something that 
happens to us. We do not hold the truth, truth is something that 
happens, and something to which we have to listen. To repeat, rather 
than correspondence, correctness, adequacy, identity, truth as ortothes, 
orthodoxy, there is conflict between what is covered and what gets 
uncovered. 
But let us return to the question of what it means to learn. Heid- 
egger asks: 
Man learns when he disposes everything he does so that it an-
swers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at any given 
moment. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is 
to think about.”16 
[“Der Mench lernt, insofern er sein Tun ud Lassen zu dem in 
die Entsprechung bringt, was ihm jeweils an Wesenhaftem zuge-
sprochen wird. Das Denken lernen wir, indem wir auf das achten, 
was es zu bedenken gibt”].17
“Entsprechung” is translated as “answer to”, which is not a bad trans-
lation given that what is essential is something that is one “zugespro-
chen”. Heidegger usually phrases it in the passive form. Thinking is 
not something we can decide that it is now time to set out to do: 
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thinking happens. We need to pay attention to it – “achten, was es 
zu bedenken gibt”. It is “es” that gives us something to think about. 
Not “das Ich”, but “das Es”. Members of psychoanalytic societies are 
again on familiar turf. It thinks. And we just need to go into it, as 
in Lacan’s ethical imperative concerning the unconscious; i.e., rather 
than a question of what the unconscious is, of how it exists, the uncon-
scious is ethical.18 “Achten” does not only mean “giving our mind to”, 
it also means ‘to honor’. We need to “pay attention”, literally “pay” 
when we are in analysis. Something is going on; a work is being done 
that is not just worth paying for but that you have to pay for.
Why these rather pompous formulations? To repeat, they stress 
the passive voice of thinking, rather than the active “Vorstellung” or 
“Anschaung”. They stress that we have to listen to, submit to, honor 
something that is other to us. “Most thought-provoking is that we are 
still not thinking”,19 [“Das Bedenklichste ist, dass wir noch nicht den-
ken”].20 Heidegger even repeats this one page later, also in italics. It 
sounds dramatic, perhaps even overdramatic. He proceeds to consider 
the possibility that what we need is action rather than thought: 
True, this course of events seems to demand rather that man 
should act, without delay, instead of making speeches at confer-
ences and international conventions and never getting beyond 
proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be 
done. What is lacking, then, is action, not thought. And yet – 
it could be that prevailing man has for centuries now acted too 
much and thought too little.21 
Maybe philosophers can save us from this misery? Alas:
On the contrary – preoccupation with philosophy more than 
anything else may give us the stubborn illusion that we are think-
ing just because we are incessantly ‘philosophizing’.22
Philosophers offer no hope, leading us to Heidegger’s obsessive ques-
tions: 
TO QUESTION THE QUESTIONING
“Questioning is the piety of thought.” (p. 70) [“Das Fragen ist die 
Frömmigkeit des Denkens”.]23 Being and Time ends with no less than 
three questions. When Heidegger asks What is Metaphysics?, he an-
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swers himself that it “remains a question” [“Es bleibt eine Frage”]. 
“Denn das Fragen ist die Frömmigkeit des Denkens” And in Unterwegs 
zur Sprache it goes: 
Was erfahren wir, wenn wir dies genügend bedenken? Dass das 
Fragen nicht die eigentliche Gebärde des Denkens ist, sondern 
– das Hören der Zusage dessen, was in die Frage kommen soll 
[…].24   
Heidegger also questions to question. Now, this obviously lends itself 
to caricature. That aside, what could he be trying to say? “Zusage” 
normally means, according to Wahrig deutsches Wörterbuch, “bejahende 
zustimmende Antwort”, to answer in the affirmative, and “versprech-
en”, to promise. In this context, and in accordance with what Heideg-
ger usually does, it can also be interpreted so-called literally as some-
thing that speaks to you, “Zusage”, and as something you need to 
hear. We need to listen. Throughout Heidegger’s text we find these 
phrases that carefully avoid any idea of a subject of ideas, a subject of 
“Anschauungen” and “Vorstellungen”, a subject of perception, ideas 
and knowledge, and – of course – one of his most seminal achieve-
ments: no subject of truth in the sense of correspondence. 
The question of listening, the passive listening position is not 
foreign to members of psychoanalytic societies. An analyst could be 
described as someone who needs to be able to this “Hören der Zusage 
dessen, was in die Frage kommen soll …”. Analogously, the uncon-
scious, according to Freud, is like an “index”, comparable to the index 
found at the end of academic books, sending the reader off in different 
directions. The symptom is overdetermined. When an occurrence or 
event in speech is overdetermined, it does not point to a latent con-
tent, but to various dynamic displacements of “Wortvorstellungen”, 
of signifiers, and this is what an analyst is supposed to be able to hear. 
WITHDRAWAL
Truth as the unconcealed. The event refers not just to the uncovering 
of truth, the a-letheia as an event. It also refers to withdrawal of what 
is to be thought, and this withdrawal is also an event: 
What must be thought about, turns away from man. It with-
draws from him [Es entzieht sich ihm. KH]. But how can we have 
the least knowledge of something that withdraws from the be-
157
ginning, how can we even give it a name? Whatever withdraws, 
refuses arrival. But – withdrawing is not nothing. Withdrawal 
is an event [Entzug ist Ereignis. KH]. In fact, what withdraws 
may even concern and claim man more essentially than anything 
present that strikes and touches him. Being struck by actuality 
is what we like to regard as constitutive of the actuality of the 
actual. However, in being struck by what is actual, man may be 
debarred precisely from what concerns and touches him – touch-
es him in the surely mysterious way of escaping him by its with-
drawal. The event of withdrawal could be what is most present 
in all our present, and so infinitely exceed the actuality of every-
thing actual.25 
This passage could also be a description of repression and the return 
of the repressed, the dynamic dimension of the unconscious. For ex-
ample, denial is a symptom when, like all symptoms, it functions as a 
failed repression, a failed withdrawal. A-letheia is not only revelation; 
it is also withdrawal. Truth simultaneously is withheld and touches us, 
attracts us. Truth as aletheia, the un-veiled, the nonhidden, the unfor-
gotten, occurs (ereignet). The privative “a,” like the privative “un” in 
the unconscious, implies an oscillation between revelation or unveil-
ing, on the one hand, and withdrawal, on the other. Thinking, in dis-
tinction to accumulating knowledge about the world, concerns itself 
with thinking this withdrawal.
You could easily get associations to the psychoanalytic cure as losing 
our symptoms, our cherished symptoms. Painful as they may be, we 
hold on to them because they at least provide us with some possibility 
of achieving enjoyment. A symptom, in the psychoanalytic sense of 
the concept, reveals itself – it is strange, painful, and foreign to us and 
thereby provokes thinking – but it also protects us, even prevents us 
from thinking what is to be thought by providing us with some kind 
of enjoyment (jouissance).
In conclusion: thinking needs resistance and loss in order to 
be called thinking. Could we interpret this in connection with 
Heidegger’s remark on “the god that withdraws” when the religious 
lose faith? I think so. This is a question of a god or gods in lower case, 
not God, the monotheistic God Almighty. The event is when the 
metaphysical answers to the question of Being withdraw; when we 
lose faith in our answers to the question of Being, then thinking might 
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